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One of the most remarkable stories in criminal law is the recent rise of corporate 
prosecutions across the world. In the past, even in countries that permitted corporations to be 
prosecuted for crimes, such prosecutions were not a common practice and any fines were 
minimal. In the past fifteen years, though, in the United States, many of the largest corporate 
prosecutions in the world have been brought, often involving international crimes by 
multinational companies. Billion dollar corporate penalties are now a regular occurrence. 
Multinational prosecutions have also involved cooperation by prosecutors across countries and 
parallel prosecutions of the same corporation for crimes committed in different countries.  
Over the past decade and a half, federal prosecutors in the U.S. have adopted an approach 
in which settlement negotiations with companies are resolved, sometimes through a plea 
agreement, but in the largest cases, with agreements entered largely out of court and without 
judicial oversight. These agreements, called deferred and non-prosecution, have added new 
flexibility but also some additional uncertainty to the practice of corporate prosecutions. This 
U.S. approach has impacted countries that have sought to emulate the U.S. approach or adopted 
approaches seeking to improve upon it. In this Chapter, I discuss how this new U.S. approach has 
altered the international corporate prosecution landscape. 
First, I discuss how traditionally, in most countries, corporate or entity-based criminal 
liability is limited and unavailable for many types of crimes. However, in recent years, this has 
changed. More countries have expanded corporate criminal liability, including in response to 
treaties like the OECD and the Lisbon Treaty which encouraged E.U. members to adopt criminal 
sanctions to legal persons. An additional driver of these changes has been a response to 
enforcement approaches in the U.S. Second, I discuss how when many countries do adopt 
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criminal liability for entities, they do so for specific crimes. Indeed, although in the U.S. there is 
a general and broad federal respondeat superior standard, corporate criminal enforcement 
patterns vary quite a bit depending on the area. Settlements in foreign bribery cases look very 
different than settlements in pharmaceutical cases, and in some areas, like in Antitrust, the entire 
enforcement approach is distinct. 
 The general approach relying on more informal settlements with corporations has also 
spread, making corporate prosecutors possible, perhaps, in countries that had been reluctant to 
bring criminal cases against corporations. In some criminal practice areas, such as foreign 
bribery prosecutions, almost all cases brought in the U.S. and around the world have been 
resolved through settlements. Both enforcers and corporations may seek to settle cases, since 
criminal convictions may implicate debarment or suspension of companies from government 
contracts or programs. In turn, more countries have considered adopting a U.S.-style corporate 
settlement program. In foreign bribery cases, that is already the case, not just in the U.S., but in 
other countries, including Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, and Switzerland, in which corporate bribery cases have been 
resolved through settlements.1 The U.K. has introduced a deferred prosecution agreement 
program modelled on that in the U.S. Law commissions and legislators in Australia, 2 Canada, 3 
and Ireland4 have considered adopting such approaches. In France, new bribery legislation 
rejected such an approach. The OECD Working Group on Bribery has raised detailed questions 
concerning out of court settlements. 
If corporate cases are to be settled, due to their informality, flexibility, or reduced 
collateral consequences, a series of practical questions then arise. What should the substance of 
the terms of corporate prosecution agreements contain? How should fines be assessed? How 
should compliance be measured and evaluated? How should compliance or governance be 
improved through the use of such agreements? To what degree should collateral consequences be 
considered? To what degree should companies be rewarded for self-reporting or for cooperation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 World Bank/Star, Left Out of The Bargain: Settlements in Foreign Bribery Cases and Implications for Asset 
Recovery 17-32 (2014), at http://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/9781464800863.pdf.  
2 Parliament of Australia, An Inquiry Into the Measures Concerning the Activities of Australian Corporations, 
Entities, Organisations, Individuals, Government and Related Parties with Respect to Foreign Bribery, at 
3 Institute for Research on Public Policy, Finding the Right Balance: Policies to Combat White-Collar Crime in 
Canada and Maintain Integrity of Public Procurement (March 2016). 
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in investigation of individual employees or officers? How long should the agreements be? What 
should the consequences be for a breach, and who should decide whether there is a breach? Who 
should supervise the implementation of a corporate prosecution agreement? To what degree can 
victims be involved and compensated? What credit should be given for enforcement and 
penalties in other jurisdictions? Each of these questions raises important and challenging issues. 
Each has been the subject of real disagreement in the United States experience with corporate 
prosecutions in recent years. To discuss corporate criminal liability, and not whether the 
corporation should cooperate in the prosecution of individual officers and employees, and to 
what degree those individual prosecutions should be prioritized, leaves out the central goal of 
criminal law: to hold wrongdoers accountable. The differences among enforcers regarding how 
to best answer those questions help to illustrate the challenges of holding corporations 
adequately accountable. 
This Chapter begins by discussing: (1) varying standards for corporate criminal liability; 
then (2) underlying corporate crimes and how standards and enforcement approaches may vary 
depending on the type of crime; (3) settlement approaches towards corporate criminal cases; (4) 
criticisms of corporate crime settlement approaches; and (5) international approaches and 
cooperation in corporate crime cases. There are no definitive answers to the question whether to 
adopt one approach or another towards corporate criminal liability. Corporate crimes can be 
incredibly costly and serious, but hopefully the experimentation with enforcement approaches 
will continue to produce increased enforcement and stronger deterrents against corporate crime 
across the globe.  
 
I. Standards for Corporate Criminal Liability  
 
Few foreign countries have anything like the broad standard for corporate criminal 
liability that the United States has long had in federal courts in any specific area of criminal 
liability, much less as a general standard for corporate criminal liability. Corporate criminal 
liability has long existed in the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Netherlands.  Other 
common law countries such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand also have some form of 
corporate criminal liability, but in most the concept remains quite narrow. However, civil law 
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countries in Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere long had no corporate criminal liability 
except in limited areas, such as in antitrust or environmental crimes.9  
Many countries viewed it conceptually problematic to hold an artificial entity liable for 
criminal acts of agents. For example, Germany has long lacked corporate criminal liability; 
instead, it may apply enhanced civil administrative penalties if a corporation violates a criminal 
provision.10 In the past two decades, more European countries have enacted corporate criminal 
statutes, partially in response to principles from the European Union and Council of Europe that 
member states adopt some form of corporate criminal accountability. Another Chapter in this 
Volume discusses those changes.11 France was the first European country to introduce corporate 
criminal liability, in 1994 (expanded to all offenses in 2005),12 with Brazil introducing it in 1998, 
Belgium in 1999,13 Italy in 2001,14 and Spain in 2010.15 Countries in Asia including China, 
India, Japan, and Korea, the Middle East, including Israel, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, 
and in Africa including South Africa, have also adopted corporate criminal liability.  
The United States adopts the broadest standard for corporate criminal liability. State 
prosecutors targeted corporations for crimes, particularly the common law crime of nuisance, in 
the nineteenth century.16 By the twentieth century, federal prosecutors began to pursue charges 
more often, particularly after the Supreme Court affirmed a respondeat superior standard for 
corporate criminal liability in 1909.17 The respondeat superior standard used in federal courts in 
the United States, permits a corporation to be prosecuted for the actions of an agent within the 
scope of employment. The crime committed by the employee must have been for the benefit of 
the corporation or organization, but they may have also benefited or even primarily benefited the 
employee. It does not have to be a high-level employee or officer. The company may have had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For an excellent and detailed overview, see Mark Pieth and Radha Ivory, Emergence and Convergence: Corporate 
Criminal Liability Principles in Overview, in Corporate Criminal Liability (Peith and Ivory, eds., Springer 2011).	  
10 Article 30 of the Ordnungswidrigkeitsgesetz (OWiG), or the Administrative Offenses Act; for a description of the 
use of this provision in bribery cases in Germany, see OECD, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention in Germany (2011), 33, http://www.oecd.org/germany/Germanyphase3reportEN.pdf.  
11 See [Juliette Tricot, chapter 24]. 
12 31 December 2005 (Law No 2004-204 of 9 March 2004).  
13 Law of 4 May 1999. 
14 Decreto Legistativo no. 231 of 2001 ("Law 231").  
15 Clifford Chance, Corporate Liability in Europe (January 2012), at 
https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/PDFs/Corporate_Liability_in_Europe.pdf. 
16 Edward B. Diskant, Comparative Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine Through 
Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 Yale L. J. 126, 134-35 (2008). 
17 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 491–95 (1909) (approving corporate criminal 
liability under a respondeat superior standard). 
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policies counseling against such conduct or instructed its employees not do engage in such 
conduct, but the company is nevertheless strictly liable. That federal standard in the U.S. is the 
broadest in use in the world. However, that standard has been moderated in practice by charging 
guidelines used by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) as well as by sentencing guidelines for 
organizations, which I will discuss further in sections to follow.18 
 Most countries that adopt some version of corporate criminal liability have begun to do 
so cautiously. Countries adopt corporate criminal liability either for certain specific crimes, or 
they limit corporate criminal liability under more general laws to conduct involving specific 
crimes or “leading persons” such as high-level officers.19 Indeed, within the United States, many 
states do not use the federal respondeat superior standard, and instead they use the Model Penal 
Code requirement that conduct by an employee be permitted or tolerated by management.20 In 
France, for example, the corporation may be convicted only if employees acted through express 
power of attorney or delegation of power to employees; however, more recent cases have 
expanded the concept of delegation to include negligent supervision or compliance.21 
In the United Kingdom, an “identification approach” had long been followed. 
Corporations have long been held criminally liable in the U.K.22 A corporation is liable if senior 
officers acted as the “directing mind” in committing crimes. Although its courts had rejected 
respondeat superior liability,23 the U.K. has adopted a respondeat superior approach in more 
recent legislation. The Corporate Manslaughter and Homicide Act of 2007 adopted respondeat 
superior for entities when gross negligence causes a person’s death.24 The U.K. Bribery Act of 
2010 similarly permits strict liability for organizations that fail to prevent bribery.25 Thus, the 
standards for corporate criminal liability have broadened and moved more towards a strict 
standard along the lines of the federal standard in the U.S. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, § 9-28.000, Principles of Federal Prosecution Of Business Organizations (revised in 
November, 2015), at http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000-principles-federal- prosecution-business-
organizations. 
19 Sara Sun Beale and Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us about American Critiques of 
Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 Buffalo Crim. L. Rev. 110 (2004); Luca Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A 
Comment from Old Europe on Post-Enron Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 911 (2003).  
20 MPC § 2.07.   
21 Clifford Chance,  supra, at 10. 
22 Regina v. Birmingham & Gloucester Railway, 114 Eng. Rep. 492 (Q.B. 1842). 
23 See, e.g., Tesco Supermarkets v. Natrass, [1972] A.C. 153 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Q.B.). 
24 Corporate Manslaughter and Homicide Act, 2007, c. 19, § 1 (Eng.). 
25 The Bribery Act 2010 (c.23). 
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 In Australia, most states follow the identification approach from the U.K. However, as in 
the U.K., legislation has broadened corporate criminal liability in recent years. The federal 
Criminal Code Act of 1995 adopts respondeat superior liability.26 Further, if the crime requires 
only negligence, then the corporation can be held liable “as a whole” by “aggregating the 
conduct” of employees, agents or officers.27 Corporate culture can be considered when deciding 
whether a corporation should be held accountable for an offense requiring a showing of 
knowledge, recklessness, or intent. The corporation may also be liable for negligence based on 
corporate culture, including policies, practices, compliance, or training, or evidence the company 
tolerated or supported commission of such a crime.28 For crimes with higher levels of intent 
required, a high-level agent must carry out or authorize the crime, or a company can be liable 
based on a corporate culture that “directed, encouraged, tolerated, or led to non-compliance.”29  
Canadian courts follow the same identification standard as in the U.K., although they 
may look lower down in the corporation to identify the relevant “directing mind.” A new law in 
Canada makes it a crime for a company to engage in gross negligence as well as negligent 
supervision that leads to harm to workers or the public. For crimes that require a higher mental 
state, prosecutors must show that higher-level officers had that intent.30 
A useful overview of corporate criminal liability standards in a range of countries can be 
found in a Fall 2016 OECD Stocktaking Report, which surveyed the corporate criminal liability 
standards of its member countries.31 The OECD found that at least 38 countries (93% of OECD 
members) can hold legal persons liable “when a person with the highest level of managerial 
authority commits the offence.” At least 31 countries (76%) also hold an organization liable if a 
person with managerial authority directs or authorizes the criminal acts. At least 29 countries 
hold companies liable if an officer or other manager fails to prevent the offence “through a 
failure to supervise … or … a failure to implement adequate controls.” Still other countries adopt 
corporate criminal liability but permit, as a defense, a corporation to avoid criminal liability if it 
shows that it exercised due diligence. For example, Belgium, Italy, Poland, and Spain have such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Austl. Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 12.2. 
27 Id. § 12.4(2). 
28 Id. § 12 (2). 
29 Id. § 12.3(2)(c)-(d). 
30 Canada Crim. Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 217.1 (2009). 
31 OECD, The Liability of Legal Persons for Foreign Bribery: A Stocktaking Report (2016), 
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/Liability-Legal-Persons-Foreign-Bribery-Stocktaking.pdf. 
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affirmative defenses.32 There has been discussion among academics about whether such a 
defense would be useful in other countries, including the U.S. One concern is whether a 
company at which crimes were committed could easily show that its compliance was adequate. 
A separate practical concern is that corporations tend not to want to litigate corporate crimes, and 
compliance may already informally affect settlement negotiations. 
 
II. Underlying Corporate Crimes  
 
In the U.S., a variety of crimes are commonly charged as against corporations, including 
antitrust, environmental crimes, foreign bribery, fraud, money laundering offenses, securities 
fraud, and others. Some of these crimes, like the federal crimes of wire fraud and mail fraud, are 
incredibly broad. Different approaches to various crimes characterize how prosecutors respond to 
corporate criminal liability. 
One of the most distinct and successful approaches is the U.S. Department of Justice’s 
Antitrust Division’s Leniency Program. That approach strongly incentivizes firms to be the first 
to report cartel behavior, relying on the inherent instability of price fixing cartels among 
competitors.33 Many countries have adopted similar approaches towards price fixing cartel 
enforcement, and parallel civil litigation is now common. There has been a “convergence in 
leniency programs,” with dozens of countries adopting programs modelled on the U.S. Antitrust 
Division approach. 34 In turn, this has made it “more attractive for companies to simultaneously 
seek and obtain amnesty in the United States, Europe, Canada and other jurisdictions.”35 
Converging approaches, cooperation in investigations, and a priority on antitrust enforcement in 
countries like the U.S., has encouraged more enforcement around the world. 
Other groups of federal prosecutors in the U.S. have adopted their own distinct 
approaches. The U.S. Department of Justice’s Tax Division adopted a programmatic amnesty 
program for Swiss Banks facilitating tax evasion in the U.S., with a structured set of settlement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Clifford Change,  supra, at 2. 
33 Antitrust Division, Leniency Program, at http://www.justice.gov/atr/leniency-program. 
34 Gary R. Spratling & D. Jarrett Arp, The International Leniency Revolution 8–9 (2003), at http:// 
www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/TheInternationalLeniencyRevolution.aspx.  
35 J. Anthony Chavez, More Aggressive Action to Curb International Cartels, 1739 Practising L. Inst. Corp. 807, 
813–16, 839 (2009).  
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options designed to incentivize self- reporting, cooperation, and disclosure of names of 
taxpayers.  
U.S. environmental crime enforcement is also distinct. The Environment and Natural 
Resources Division at the DOJ does not normally use deferred and non-prosecution agreements. 
Civil enforcers bring tens of thousands of civil actions each year, but they refer few cases to 
criminal prosecutors. When criminal cases are brought, plea agreements with criminal 
convictions are the norm. In the area of vessel pollution, the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships has played an important role, leading to the enactment of the 
Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS) and to increased U.S. enforcement in recent years.36 
The cases are often brought to the attention of the Coast Guard due to a whistleblower program 
rewarding seamen who report illegal oily discharges to them; the reward may consist in as much 
as half of the criminal fine, and the fines in these cases are sometimes in the millions of dollars.37  
The Fraud Section has adopted a detailed pilot program for Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA) cases involving foreign bribery, with very detailed rules for what degree of leniency 
corporations may receive depending on their self-reporting and cooperation, as well as the 
conduct. The Fraud Section notes that the U.S. “is not going at this alone,” and has been 
adopting “an international approach” by working collaboratively with law enforcement “around 
the globe.” Recent cases depending on international cooperation included FCPA prosecutions of 
Acher Daniels Midland, Alcoa, Alstom, Dallas Airmotive, Hewlett-Packard, IAP, Marubeni, 
Parker Drilling, PetroTiger, Total, and Vimpelcome. 38 
 As described, in some of these specific areas, countries that otherwise do not have 
corporate criminal liability have adopted corporate criminal liability statutes. In the area of 
foreign bribery, more countries now have specific legislation for corporate criminal liability. 
While the OECD does not require that member states adopt corporate criminal liability if their 
legal system does not currently have it, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the U.N. 
Convention Against Corruption have encouraged enactment of anti-corruption legislation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 The Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901–15 (2006); see International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319, amended by Protocol, Feb. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 
546 (also known as MARPOL); see also H.R. Rep. No. 96-1224, at 1–2 (1980).  
37 33 U.S.C. § 51908(b) (2006) (“An amount equal to not more than 1/2 of such penalties may be paid by the 
Secretary, or the Administrator as provided for in this chapter, to the person giving information leading to the 
assessment of such penalties.”).  
38 U.S. Department of Justice, The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance, 
1-2 (April 5, 2016), at https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/838416/download. 
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generally.39 As described, France adopted new corporate criminal provisions as part of its 
comprehensive anti-corruption legislation. The Ukraine also recently adopted corporate criminal 
liability as part of anti-corruption legislation.40 In Brazil, environmental offenses had been the 
only type of corporate criminal liability, with the Environmental Crimes Law enacted in 1998.41 
Criminal procedure rules, however, were not adapted to corporations, and criminal prosecutions 
for environmental crimes in Brazil remained rare.42 
 
III. Negotiated Corporate Settlements  
 
In the United States, corporate prosecutions have exploded in size.43 That is, more 
corporations are not being prosecuted by federal prosecutors, but the size of the penalties in the 
largest cases that have exponentially increased. Multi-billion dollar fines are now an annual 
occurrence. Many were quite high-profile prosecutions; well over half were public corporations, 
and many were Fortune 500 and Global 500 companies.44 
In the 1990s, if corporations were prosecuted in the U.S., they were typically convicted 
and sentenced by a judge. Today, far more of the truly important corporate prosecutions do not 
result in a conviction but rather are resolved alternatives called deferred prosecution agreements. 
A deferred prosecution is filed with the court and consists in an agreement to toll the Speedy 
Trial Act deadlines and to keep the case inactive on the judge’s docket until a time period for the 
defendant to comply is completed. Then the case is dismissed. Such agreements had been often 
used as an alternative to an indictment and conviction for first-time offenders or juveniles, but it 
was a new idea to use them in serious corporate cases. A non-prosecution agreement is a variant 
that is completely out of court; it is never filed with a judge. Rather,  in it prosecutors agree that 
they will not file a case if the corporation complies with the terms of the agreement. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
(OECD Anti-Bribery Convention); United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). 
40 http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/7/30/ukraine-enacts-sweeping-new-anti-corruption-legislation.html. 
41 Environmental Criminal Law, 9.605/1998.  
42 http://fcpamericas.com/english/brazil/corporate-criminal-liability-united-states-brazil-comparative-analysis-2/. 
43 Brandon L. Garrett, Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations Ch.1, 294 (Harvard U. 
Press 2014) (describing an increase in average corporate fines over the past two decades, from less than $2,000,000 
in average fines per year before 2000, to over $15,000,000 in average corporate fines by 2010). 
44 Id. at 62 (noting that thirty-one percent of corporations were either a Fortune or Global 500 firm the year they 
settled their prosecutions). 
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The adoption of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Chapter designed specifically for 
organizations, in 1991, heralded an increase in corporate criminal fines. Those Guidelines 
included provisions to reduce fines for corporations with effective ethics and compliance 
programs, and they also based fines on the size of a company and the involvement of top-level 
officials. Thus, although the federal respondeat superior standard is broad, these Guidelines 
attempted to set out a more nuanced approach towards punishing corporations criminally. Under 
the federal Alternative Fines Act, a company can also be ordered to pay up to twice the “gross 
gain or loss” from the offense; the provision is not frequently used, however.45  
In 1999, under then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, the DOJ issued its first memo 
providing a set of guidelines to advise federal prosecutors on how to bring corporate 
prosecutions.46 At that time, however, prosecutors had only used a few deferred prosecutions 
with corporations. The idea was still novel. The deferred prosecution approach took off after a 
2003 revision to the DOJ guidelines that added “Principles” for the prosecution of organizations 
in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual used by federal prosecutors.47 The DOJ has revised the guidelines 
several more times, including in Fall 2015 to emphasize the importance of investigating 
individual wrongdoing in corporate cases. The new guidelines now contain a section announcing 
the new “focus on individual wrongdoers” including from the earliest stages in a corporate 
criminal investigation.48 The revised principles also emphasize that cooperation credit will only 
be given to a company that identifies responsible individuals: “In order for a company to receive 
any consideration for cooperation under this section, the company must identify all individuals 
involved in or responsible for the misconduct at issue, regardless of their position, status or 
seniority.”49 Prosecutors weigh as a separate factor self-reporting by firms in the form of a 
“timely and voluntary disclosure.”50 The principles also add a section on coordinating parallel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 8 U.S.C. § 2571(c)(3).  
46 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, to Component Heads and 
United States Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999). 
47 Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Larry D. Thompson, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components 
& U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003) 
(called the “Thompson Memo” after the Deputy Attorney General who issued it). 
48 U.S.A.M, § 9-28.210.  
49 U.S.A.M, § 9-28.700.  
50 U.S.A.M, § 9-28.900.  
	   11	  
proceedings, to encourage cooperation between prosecutors and those pursuing civil, regulatory 
and administrative actions.51 
 However, the guidelines largely maintain a flexible approach, encouraging consideration 
of a broad set of factors when deciding whether to pursue an indictment or conviction, or 
alternatively, a deferred or non-prosecution agreement. Those factors include: (1) the nature and 
seriousness of the offense, (2) the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, (3) the 
company’s history of similar conduct, including civil and criminal actions; (4) the corporation’s 
willingness to cooperate in investigation of its agents, (5) the corporate compliance program, (6) 
timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing; (7) any remedial actions, such as firing 
wrongdoers and cooperating with government agencies; (8) the collateral consequences that a 
prosecution would cause, including to shareholders, (9) whether it would be sufficient to impose 
civil or regulatory remedies, and (10) the adequacy of prosecutions of individuals.52 Those 
factors are “illustrative” and not an exclusive or “exhaustive” list, and “no single factor will be 
dispositive.” Thus, prosecutors retain substantial discretion to weigh these various considerations 
in any given case. 
Despite that flexibility, common approaches can be observed when reading the terms of 
these agreements. Deferred prosecution agreements are commonly quite complex, as are the 
goals of these corporate prosecution agreements. The agreements can include criminal fines, as 
well as other penalties such as restitution to victims, civil forfeiture, payments to regulators, and 
community service payments. They can specify compliance terms, including creation of new 
positions to supervise compliance, changes to governance, new auditing systems, and retention 
of independent monitors to supervise compliance. The DOJ’s guidelines note prosecutors should 
try to assess whether the compliance program is just a “paper program” and should consider 
“whether the corporation has provided for a staff sufficient to audit, document, analyze, and 
utilize the results of the corporation's compliance efforts.”53 The DOJ has also made new efforts 
to conduct detailed review of such compliance provisions. These agreements typically last from 
two to three years. 
I have examined the terms of these U.S. deferred and non-prosecution agreements with 
corporations in some details. About one quarter require the retention of monitors to supervise 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 U.S.A.M, § 1-12.000. 
52 Id. §§ 9-28.000–9-28.100, 9-28.300.  
53 U.S.A.M. 9-28.800. 
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compliance, but most do not. The fines are often not all that they could be. I collected a set of 
federal deferred and non-prosecution agreements beginning in 2001.54  I was surprised to learn 
that in almost half of the deferred and non-prosecution agreements with companies entered from 
2001-2012, no criminal fine was imposed.55 I also found that for public companies prosecuted 
from 2001-2012, total payments made to prosecutors averaged just 0.09 percent of market 
capitalization.56 From 2001-2014, prosecutors entered 306 deferred and non-prosecution 
agreements with companies. Among those, only 34 percent or 103 companies had officers or 
employees prosecuted, with 408 total individuals prosecuted. Few of those individuals were 
higher-up officers or executives.  
U.S. prosecutors have also targeted financial institutions far more than ever before. In 
recent cases, they have not used deferred prosecution agreements but rather secured guilty pleas 
from banks.57 The principles do say that “prosecutors should generally seek a plea to an 
appropriate offense,” and also that “generally” this should be a plea to the “most serious, readily 
provable offense charged.”58 While the guidelines regarding organizational prosecutions in the 
U.S. do not state with any specificity when a conviction is appropriate versus a deferred 
prosecution agreement, prosecutors do appear more willing to seek convictions, including in high 
profile cases, than in the past decade, when many of the most significant corporate prosecutions 




In Canada, corporations may plead guilty, under a plea bargaining system in which the 
judge may accept or reject the plea and the judge ultimately imposes the sentence. The plea 
agreements are not made public, but the accompanying statements of facts are public.59 In 
addition to any penalty, a fifteen percent surcharge is added towards provincial victim restitution 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 I have maintained for some time the most complete data available on such federal deferred and non-prosecution 
agreements with corporations. See Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational Prosecution 
Agreements, University of Virginia School of Law, (last updated July 31, 2015).  
55 Garrett, Too Big to Jail,  supra note 6, at 69. 
56 Id. at 150 (noting that few deferred or non-prosecution agreements from 2001-2012 included a guidelines 
calculation, only 30 of them, and only three of those noted fines at the top of the applicable range). 
57 Brandon L. Garrett, The Rise of Bank Prosecutions, 126 Yale L.J. Forum 33 (2016). 
58 U.S.A.M, § 9-28.1500. 
59 OECD, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the Canada (2011), 20, 22, at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/Canadaphase3reportEN .pdf. 
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funds.60 The approach does not permit the type of informal corporate settlements that are now 
common in the U.S., but there has been some discussion of the possibility of introducing 




In the United Kingdom, corporations have long been criminally liable. Corporations have 
often settled criminal cases through guilty pleas. In such cases, the corporation admits guilt and 
receives a conviction. In addition, corporations may enter a Civil Recovery Order, in which a 
payment is made but there is no civil judgment.61 The United Kingdom adopted deferred 
prosecution agreements with corporations by statute in the Crime and Courts Act of 2013.62 One 
event prompting the legislation was the concern raised by the judge in the Innospec case, 
involving foreign bribery charges resolved in a 2010 settlement between the Serious Fraud 
Office, as well as prosecutors in the U.S. The judge called argued that in any criminal settlement 
process, “it is for the court to decide on the sentence and to explain that to the public.”63 The 
high court judge ruled prosecutors had unconstitutionally reached a sentencing arrangement with 
the company and that “no such arrangements should be made again.”64  
The 2013 legislation permits such corporate settlements, but only with judicial oversight 
and approval. A detailed code of practice for prosecutors was published by the Crown 
Prosecution Service and Serious Fraud Office accompanying the legislation, and emphasizing the 
importance of the public interest in whether to offer a DPA.65 The prosecutor must obtain a 
declaration from a judge that the DPA is “likely to be in the interests of justice” and that the 
terms are “fair, reasonable, and proportionate.”66 Once the agreement is negotiated, the terms are 
presented to the Crown Court for approval, and the judge can review the substance of the 
agreement and decide whether the agreement is “fair, reasonable, and proportionate.”67 In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 See Department of Justice (Canada), “Provisions of Interest to Victims of Crime,” http://www.justice .gc 
.ca/eng/cj-jp/victims-victimes/code.html. 
61 World Bank/STAR,  supra note 1, at 26-27. 
62 Crime and Courts Act of 2013, at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/22/schedule/17/enacted. 
63 http://www.banksr.co.uk/images/Other%20Documents/Crown%20Court%20decisions/R%20v%20Innospec.pdf. 
64 Id.  
65 U.K. Crown Prosecution Service and Serious Fraud Office “Deferred Prosecution Agreements Code of Practice” 
(2014), at https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/directors_guidance/dpa_cop.pdf. 
66 Section 45 of and Schedule 17(7) to the U.K. Crime and Courts Act 2013. 
67 Id. at Schedule 17(8)(1). 
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addition, any failure to comply with a DPA has consequences set out and a judge will adjudicate 
any possible breach. The first deferred prosecution agreement in the U.K., with Standard Bank, 
was approved by the judge, noting, in contrast to the situation in Innospec, that the court was 
permitted to make a “detailed analysis” of the circumstances of the offense and the financial 
penalty imposed and that “there is no question of the parties having reached a private 




In France, while corporate criminal liability existed, a statutory scheme that permits 
judicially-approved settlements with corporations in foreign bribery cases was recently enacted 
in Fall 2016. This Sapin II legislation calls for regulation of corporate compliance programs, the 
creation of a new French anti-bribery agency to issue such regulations, as well as the adoption of 
specific provisions regarding judicial review and approval of deferred prosecution agreements in 
criminal cases.69 The French lawmakers explicitly rejected the proposal to adopt a U.S.-style 
model in which deferred prosecution agreements with corporations could be entered largely out 
of court. Instead, the Sapin II legislation adopts a model more along the lines of the U.K. 
approach in which judicial review is required, but also with more involvement and regulation by 
an administrative agency overseeing anti-corruption efforts. 
 
Additional Out-of-Court Settlement Approaches 
 
Other countries have long used more informal settlement mechanisms in corporate crime 
cases. The Netherlands permits out of court settlements with corporations under article 74 of the 
Dutch Criminal Code and a Directive on Large and Special Transactions.70 Several foreign 
bribery cases have been resolved through such settlements. For example, in 2016, Openbaar 
Ministerie entered such a settlement with Russian telecom company Vimpelcom, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Serious Fraud Office v Standard Bank Plc: Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Case No: U20150854), English 
High Court, Queen’s Bench Division (Leveson P), 30 November 2015, at https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/sfo-v-standard-bank_Final_1.pdf.  
69 https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/update-sapin-ii-law 
70 Debevoise and Plimpton, Small Country, Big Punch: the Netherlands Anti-Bribery Prosecution of SBM Offshore, 
December 2014, http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1ef21f00-f4af-4e39-a0f6-2b309dd9bb6f.  
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simultaneously settled with the U.S. Department of Justice, and with almost $400 million paid to 
Dutch and U.S. authorities.71 In Norway, corporate prosecutions are also often settled out of 
court. In Norway, the mechanism is a penalty notice in which the prosecutor sets out the fine to 
be imposed.72 Økokrim, the Norwegian authority that handles economic and environmental 
crimes, frequently uses penalty notices in corporate cases.73 Økokrim explained to the OECD in 
2011 that “economic crime trials are usually very lengthy and a much bigger burden on law 
enforcement resources .... furthermore, representatives of companies sometimes also prefer a 
swifter conclusion to a case to minimise the reputational risks to their corporation.”74  
In Italy, corporations may settle criminal matters under the patteggiamento system, which 
resembles a plea bargain, and is overseen by judges.75 If a company enters a patteggiamento, the 
entity may obtain a one-third reduction in the penalty, avoid making an admission of guilt, avoid 
debarment or other regulatory sanctions, and benefit from a possible “extinction” of the sentence 
after five years. The OECD has criticized the lack of information made public in cases in which 
companies settle charges using a patteggiamento.76  
Other countries use informal mechanisms to resolve corporate charges. Switzerland uses 
a summary punishment order, typically used for misdemeanor offenses, and a mechanism called 
“Reparation” after which charges are dropped if the defendant provides compensation.77 In 
foreign bribery cases, including regarding Alstom and a subsidiary of Siemens, Reparation was 
used to settle cases.78 Greece has settled foreign bribery cases against corporations using 
Parliamentary decree.79 In Brazil, the Federal Public Ministry has entered leniency agreements 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 https://www.om.nl/algemeen/english/@93227/vimpelcom-pays-close/.  
72 http://thebriberyact.com/2014/12/12/the-corruption-enforcement-view-from-norway-by-frode-elgesem/.  
73 OECD Working Group on Bribery, Phase 3 Report on implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 
Norway, June 2011, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/Norwayphase3reportEN.pdf.  
74 Ibid. Para 64 
75 OECD Working Group on Bribery, Phase 3 Report on implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Italy, 
December 2011, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/Italyphase3reportEN.pdf.  
76 OECD Working Group on Bribery, Italy: Follow-up to the Phase 3 Report and Recommendations, May 2014, 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ItalyP3WrittenFollowUpReportEN.pdf 
77 Sections 352, 358 of the Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure (SCCP). 
78 See Case EAII.04.0325-LEN, Alstom Network Schweiz AG, summary punishment order under Article 352 of the 
Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure (SCCP) (22 November 2011); see also OECD Working Group on Bribery, 
“Phase 3 report on implementing the Anti-Bribery Convention in Switzerland,” December 2011: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/Switzerlandphase3reportEN.pdf 
79 World Bank/Star,  supra note 1, at 131-133. 
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with corporations, most prominently, with Odebrecht regarding the national Operation Car Wash 
scandal; questions remain whether other government agencies will honor the settlement.80 
 
IV. Concerns with Corporate Prosecution Settlement Approaches 
 
While the settlement-oriented approach towards corporate prosecutors has provided 
prosecutors with a great deal of flexibility, concerns have been raised with that approach in the 
U.S. and internationally. As discussed, countries such as the U.K. and France have adopted 
settlement regimes that involve more judicial supervision to alleviate concerns with such 
settlements, while preserving some of the flexibility that they provide. A series of functional 
considerations should be considered when deciding whether and how to pursue corporate 
prosecutions.  
Transparency has been one concern raised regarding corporate settlements. Full trial or 
full criminal process can produce a public record concerning the crimes committed, full 
notification to victims, and a public trial or at least a public sentencing. Corporate defendants, of 
course, seek to avoid negative publicity in reaching a settlement with the authorities. One benefit 
corporate defendants may receive is the ability to not fully admit guilt (in the U.S., that is done in 
civil cases, but an admission of guilt is routine in criminal settlements). Some settlements do 
report the amounts of fines paid and some description of the facts, but often not based on a 
complete record or a detailed statement of facts. A separate concern has been with the amount of 
the fines themselves and how they are calculated. The DOJ has stated that punishment and 
deterrence can be accomplished by “substantial fines.”81 What amount is appropriate, though, 
may be difficult to assess. The harm to victims may be difficult to calculate, and the profit to a 
corporate may be hard to measure of a financial scheme was not fully carried out. Legislation 
was proposed in the U.S. Senate, although not enacted, to require greater transparency in 
corporate fines.82 Organizational sentencing guidelines in the U.S. set out detailed criteria for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Maira Magro, Odebrecht Fears “Government Disloyalty” In Leniency Agreements, Valor, March 13, 2017. 
81 U.S.A.M, § 9-28.1500. 
82 Danielle Douglas, Senate Bill Targets Corporations That Deduct Settlement Payouts, Wash. Post. Nov. 6, 2013 
(describing proposed Government Settlement Transparency and Reform Act. 
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corporate fines, but they have been criticized and they are often not used in cases that settle 
through deferred or non-prosecution agreements. 83 
An additional concern has been with the structural or compliance terms of agreements. 
Without judicial review, prosecutors may be less able than judges or regulators to independently 
assess whether corporations are complying fully with the non-financial terms of the agreements. 
The DOJ has retained a compliance counsel to focus on reviewing and improving the compliance 
terms of corporate agreements.84 Recently, the DOJ has issued guidance on the subject of 
corporate compliance, which is another improvement. In the past, many agreements had stated 
that a company should adopt best practices or a compliance program, but without specifying how 
it should do so or whether or how compliance efforts should be assessed.85 
A separate concern has been that when prosecutors settle with corporations, while they 
may impose fines and compliance reforms, they may fail to prosecutor or deter executives other 
individual culprits. I have found, for example, that in only about a third of deferred and non-
prosecution agreements, are any individuals prosecuted, and very few of those that are 
prosecuted are higher-up officers or executives.86 Securing the cooperation of the corporation in 
investigations of individuals should be a central goal of corporate criminal liability, but in the 
past, that goal was not emphasized in the U.S. The more recent changes to the prosecution 
guidelines, in the Fall 2015 Yates Memo, may have placed more focus on individual 
accountability, but it is too early to tell whether that additional guidance will be effective. 
 Judicial supervision may be limited for settlements. A separate concern has been that the 
public interest may be neglected without independent judicial review, or that prosecutorial 
discretion may be too great. The General Accountability Office criticized the DOJ in the U.S. for 
lack of criteria for deciding whether a company receives a deferred or non-prosecution 
agreements.87 In 2013, federal judge Richard J. Leon rejected a deferred prosecution agreement 
with a company for foreign bribery, “looking at the DPA in its totality” and noting that not only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, The Failure of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 66 Miami L. Rev. 231 (2012). 
For an overview, see Garrett, Too Big to Jail,  supra at Ch. 6. 
84 Press Release, Department of Justice, New Compliance Counsel Expert Retained by the DOJ Fraud Section, 
November 3, 2015, at http://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/790236/download. 
85	  Garrett, Too Big to Jail,  supra note xxx at Ch.2.	  
86 Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, The N. Y. Rev. of 
Books, Jan. 9 2014; Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 Virginia L. Rev. 1789 (2015). 
87 Government Accountability Office, Preliminary Observations on the DOJ’s Use and Oversight of Deferred 
Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements, June 25, 2009, 41. 
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were “no individuals . . . being prosecuted for their conduct at issue here” but also “a number of 
the employees who were directly involved in the transactions are being allowed to remain with 
the company.”88 However, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that ruling and held that 
the judge exceeded his discretion.89 In another case, Judge Emmett Sullivan suggested that 
certain factors (could provide “useful guideposts” when evaluating whether a deferred 
prosecution agreement with a company is truly “designed to secure a defendant’s reformation” or 
whether the terms are “so vague and minimal as to render them a sham.”90 In contrast, in 
countries in which judges may review and decide whether charges are appropriately brought 
against a defendant, and judges decide upon the sentence ultimately imposed, prosecutors cannot 
exercise nearly as much discretion when negotiating with corporations.91 
 Countries have very different systems of criminal procedure, and those procedural rules 
may impact the desirability of settlement regimes and of corporate criminal liability itself. For 
example, in the U.S., corporations may decide to waive attorney-client privilege on behalf of 
employees, giving them a great deal of leverage in negotiations and also making the cooperation 
of the corporation extremely important in order to access evidence during investigations.92 In 
countries in which evidentiary privileges are narrower, corporate investigations might be more 
feasible without that corporate cooperation. In contrast, in countries in which employees are not 
typically at-will and labor protections are stronger, it may be far more difficult for a corporation 
to encourage or pressure employees or officers to cooperate with law enforcement. Civil law 
alternatives may be important as well. If a country has adequate resources for civil corporate 
investigations and sufficient penalties are available, civil enforcement may effectively substitute 
for criminal enforcement against corporations. 
Prosecutorial power is extremely broad in the U.S. Prosecutors have broad discretion to 
charge and to negotiate sentences through plea bargains and other types of agreements with 
defendants. That broad authority makes relatively more informal negotiated settlement regimes 
far more practicable in the U.S. than in countries in which judicial review would be presumed 
and out-of-court negotiations frowned upon or deemed unauthorized by law or unconstitutional. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 USA v. Fokker Services B.V., Docket No. 1:14-cr-00121 (D.D.C. Jun 04, 2014). 
89 United States v. Fokker Servs., B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 742 (D.C. Cir. 2016).  
90 Saena Tech Memorandum and Order at 45. 
91 Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 
199, 215 (2006). 
92 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
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Prosecutors in the U.S also have strong resources, the ability to bring complex cases to trial, and 
broad jurisdiction due to the role of trade with the U.S., the role that the U.S. dollar plays in 
international finance, and the U.S.-based stock exchanges, over a wide range of international 
corporations. Multinational criminal cases can be readily brought in U.S. courts. The same is not 
true of the courts in many countries. That gives U.S. prosecutors an especially prominent role in 
corporate regulation generally, and in corporate criminal liability in particular.  
 Settlements also have some important advantages. They can permit more efficient use of 
law enforcement resources, particularly in highly complex cases. Settlements can avoid firms 
suffering collateral consequences of a conviction such as debarment or suspension from 
government contracting or participation in a regulated industry. In the United States as well as in 
the European Union, for example, bribery convictions can result in debarment.93 Fines may be 
reduced to encourage cooperation in investigations of other companies and individuals. Fines 
may also be reduced to reflect parallel settlements in other countries. Negative publicity may be 
reduced for the company. What balance is appropriate between the advantages of more informal 
and flexible settlements and the advantages of more formal and rule-governed judicial 
resolutions, is a difficult moral and policy question. It is far from clear that any country has the 
right balance. 
 
V. International Cooperation 
 
 International organizations have played a role in corporate prosecutions and in promoting 
corporate accountability norms. For example, the United Nations and the World Bank have 
played a rule in foreign bribery cases.94 The OECD has played an important role in Antitrust and 
foreign bribery work. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention has established binding legal 
standards on member nations, and as the first such international law regime, it has had a great 
deal of influence. In addition, the OECD has promoted best practices, made recommendations, 
and evaluated member countries in reviews and reports. The OECD has provided advice to 
countries to combat tax crimes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 See Article 45 of the EU Procurement Contracts Directive http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ 
/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0018:en:NOT; Regulation 23 of the Public Contracts Regulations (2006) and 
Regulation 26 of the Utilities Contracts Regulations (2006) (U.K. implementation of the directive). 
94 WorldBank/STAR,  supra note 1 at 44. 
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Parallel and collaborative prosecutions are also increasingly common. For example, in 
the Siemens case, the DOJ and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the U.S. 
collaborated with the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office and German authorities, including 
based on mutual legal assistance provisions of the OECD Convention. The plea bargain by 
Siemens included $800 million in fines paid to the DOJ and SEC and $800 million in fines paid 
to the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office.95 The agreement also included two corporate monitors, 
one Independent U.S. Counsel, and a German corporate monitor, Dr. Theo Waigel, a former 
German Minister of Finance. The employees prosecuted in the case were convicted by Munich 
prosecutors; individuals were indicted in the U.S. but none so far successfully extradited.96 The 
Fraud Section at DOJ has emphasized the role that international cooperation plays in foreign 
bribery cases generally, which are international crimes. The Antitrust Division similarly has 
emphasized joint investigations and mutual assistance agreements in its cartel enforcement, and 





Corporate criminal enforcement has increased in frequency and in the size of monetary 
sanctions over the past decade.  More countries have successfully prosecuted corporations, 
particularly in areas like antitrust and foreign bribery. Most of the prosecutions and settlements 
have been brought in countries that are major financial centers, with the bulk being brought in 
the United States, but also in the U.K., France, Germany, and increasingly in certain developing 
countries. The tools to resolve these corporate prosecutions are increasingly varied, using civil, 
criminal, and hybrid mechanisms. Parallel enforcement is far more common, with cooperation 
between enforcement agencies. As countries consider whether to adopt new tools to combat 
corporate crime, they should pay attention to both the successes of new approaches and to 
concerns raised regarding whether they serve the public interest. In the past, the common 
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approach was to use corporate criminal enforcement sparingly and in limited form. As corporate 
crimes have grown in scale and in social harm, enhancing corporate liability for such crimes is a 
sensible idea. Tailoring enforcement to ensure both individual and corporate-level accountability, 
to ensure transparency and adequate incentives for cooperation and remediation, and to deter and 
prevent future crimes: that is the challenge going forward. The new international dialogue 
concerning corporate criminal liability will hopefully contribute to new experimentation and 
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